Madjar's message to the Baltic states: clear the border with Russia and create a death zone
August 13, 2026
Source: https://t.co/DoTlanYlJy
The Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Major Robert Brovdi, also known as "Madjar", recommends that the Baltic states prepare much more seriously for a possible Russian attack.
* Recommendation: create a three-to-five-kilometer-wide clean zone on the border so that there is nowhere to hide from drones.
* Underground fiber-optic cable infrastructure must be built to fully monitor the entire border with drones.
* Madjar: all this can be done quickly, even this year, if the Baltic states have the will.
Estonia and the other Baltic states still incorrectly assess Russia's military threats and do not prepare adequately enough, the commander of Ukraine's drone forces, Major Robert Brovdi (50), said in an interview with Postimees.
Madjar offered Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania his action plan on how, using drones, to quickly build a strong defense against a possible Russian attack. His recommendations are based on creating a "death zone" on the border with Russia using drones, so that, figuratively speaking, even a mouse could not slip through unnoticed.
"Guys, don't hesitate. Here are the first five steps you need to complete in 2026," said Brovdi, better known by his nickname Madjar, in an interview with Postimees in early August. "These are not complicated things. You just need to make a decision and carry it out."
Madjar did not come up with this five-step recommendation for the defense of the Baltic states, presented to Postimees, on the spot. When agreeing to the interview, it was clearly made clear to me that Madjar very much wanted to talk about the defense of the Baltic states. During the interview, it was clear that Madjar had carefully thought about what the capability and readiness of the Baltic states should be in the event of a possible Russian attack or military provocation.
According to Madjar, his recommended plan for the Baltic states is based on the goal of not letting the enemy into their territory at all. "If you already know in advance that an attack is being planned against you, you can immediately strike back and not let the enemy into your territory," he stressed.
Five proposals
Proposal 1 – create a conditional "death zone" along the border with Russia (in Lithuania's case, on the border with Belarus). It is a zone where drones can fly and attack without obstacles. The wider, the better. Given the small territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this "death zone" should be at least two to five kilometers wide.
"Cut down absolutely everything there," said Madjar. "It must be a completely open area where drones must destroy absolutely everything that moves. So that no one can hide behind trees or buildings. Everything must be clearly visible. That is your so-called buffer zone."
Proposal 2 – for the "death zone" to work, special infrastructure must be created for the use of modern technologies. All these technologies require communications. As Madjar points out, the experience of the war in Ukraine shows that the most reliable communications are via fiber-optic cable.
"Not through the air, but it must be laid in the ground. 30–50 centimeters underground," said Madjar. "And these communications must be provided along the entire length of your border, forming a unified network."
The fiber-optic cable network placed along the entire border must be interconnected so that a wide variety of sensors and cameras, drone positions, communication points, and so on can be connected at different points. All this underground fiber-optic cable network must be connected between all Baltic states.
"This infrastructure built with fiber-optic cables will allow the construction of the necessary number of drone launch sites in the future, from which drones can take off, while pilots will control them remotely," said Madjar. "To ensure pilots' safety, they should work from Riga, Vilnius, London, or any other place. What matters is that it happens remotely."
Proposal 3 – an effective tactical or short-range air defense that can see 15–30 kilometers away must be created. Such air defense must be densely deployed along the created "death zone".
The purpose of such air defense is to detect all enemy reconnaissance and strike drones flying in the air. Detect them at any altitude and then destroy them either with interceptor drones, electronic warfare (EW) measures, or other methods.
"If the enemy wants to invade you, they will not come with tanks. They will not start with artillery shelling," said Madjar. "Initially, they will come with reconnaissance drones. They will look everything over, and then strike drones and missiles will fly in. You need to know this and be ready for it."
Expensive radars and expensive air defense systems should be left deeper in the rear to monitor the global situation. If expensive radar systems appear near the front, the enemy will destroy them first. "The destruction of these systems will make you blind, deaf, and helpless," Madjar stressed.
Proposal 4 – each Baltic state must create at least one specialized drone brigade. In Ukraine, one drone brigade means 300 drone crews. "They are all drone crews with different purposes," said Madjar.
To describe why comprehensive drone use with different purposes and against different targets helps to effectively fight Russian forces, Madjar uses the term "borscht recipe".
"This 'borscht recipe' includes a list of various types of crews that operate at different depths, work with different means, and are at different distances from each other," Madjar explained.
Borscht, the most famous dish of Ukrainian cuisine, will not be perfect if any of the necessary ingredients are missing. According to Madjar, the same applies to drone forces – this thing does not work if any component is missing.
In wartime conditions, a brigade of 300 crews built on the "borscht recipe" principle can cover a one-hundred-kilometer stretch, Madjar believes. In peacetime, when this brigade mainly needs to monitor the enemy and be on alert, it can also cover 500–600 kilometers, Madjar noted.
However, the best would be for the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to create separate drone forces, as has long been done in Ukraine and now also in Russia.
"What other experience do you need, when we constantly prove that it works?" Madjar asked. "Currently, we hit 80 percent of all targets with drones."
"Should I come and dance a national dance for you on this topic so you understand it? That is experience," added Madjar, known for his expressive language.
Proposal 5 – the ability to strike the logistics and military targets of an attacking enemy. This requires medium- and long-range drones and their crews.
According to Madjar, the drone brigade must prepare 30–50 crews for medium- and long-range drones capable of attacking the enemy in operational and strategic depth.
"To change the enemy's plans, to deliver strikes that would force them to change their plans and timelines," said Madjar.
Training of medium- and long-range drone pilots for the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania must begin immediately, Madjar believes. He indicated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would gladly help in this matter.
Doable this year
Creating a "death zone" on the border with Russia and laying a fiber-optic cable network are things that can be done quickly, even within this year, Madjar noted. If there is the will, stressed the leader of Ukraine's drone forces. He claimed that none of these measures require budgets measured in billions.
"It costs a few million, but you can do it yourself, and it can be done quickly," said Madjar. "Provided that the state itself does not work against it and there are no problems with private lands – about who allows something and who doesn't."
"Here you have to choose for yourselves: either you start bargaining with your businessmen, or you take a national position that all this must be done," Madjar continued. "Just do it. Give them something in return so they don't cling so much to that land. Because they themselves will be the first to suffer when the Muscovites invade you."
In 2024, the three Baltic states signed an agreement to establish a Baltic defense line on the border with Russia and Belarus. However, it will be completely different from the defense line that the commander of Ukraine's drone forces recommends building.
The already launched Baltic defense line is a system of defensive structures and obstacles consisting of fortified support points, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles, minefields, and the like. Natural obstacles are used in its construction: forests, swamps, rivers, etc. In Estonia, up to 600 platoon-level bunkers are planned.
Construction of anti-tank ditches for the Baltic defense line in the Meremäe area, Setomaa parish, this spring. Photo: Margus Ansu
If Russia attacked, this defense line, according to the vision of the Estonian Ministry of Defense, should slow down and redirect the movement of Russian units and force them to move to places where they are easier to destroy with fire. According to the creators of the defense line, this would give the forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as NATO allies, time and more favorable conditions to destroy the enemy. Strategically, the goal is deterrence – to show that a quick breakthrough in the Baltic states will not succeed and that the territory will be defended from the very first meter.
According to Madjar, the construction of such a defense line is based on the experience of previous wars. "It is not promising," he said. "You cannot stop an enemy attack with kinetics." By "kinetics", Madjar means fortifications and the firepower of traditional weapons.
"If the drone is the dominant instrument today, then the infrastructure and necessary conditions must be created precisely for drone use," he added.
Currently, there is not even a one percent probability that Russia would organize an attack on the Baltic states with tanks and mechanized columns, Madjar is convinced.
Madjar stressed that the Baltic states must create what is currently relevant and effective in Ukraine and gain experience in its use. This also includes organizing logistics with air and ground drones.
"You need to train the evacuation of the wounded with robots, not people," said Madjar. "You need to train all electronic warfare (EW) skills. And what is needed for that again? Build fiber-optic cable infrastructure."
Criticism of NATO
According to Madjar's assessment, the probability of a Russian attack is increased by the fact that NATO has so far not demonstrated unity and adequate action in the face of Kremlin provocations.
"A Russian drone enters your airspace, then a missile, then an aircraft overflies and conducts reconnaissance, then a warship approaches and also conducts reconnaissance, but you only express concern that you don't like it," said Madjar.
"Shoot it down when it approaches! Fire a shot so it sinks, and it won't come back," Madjar advised. "But you don't do that. I am talking about NATO countries. You only start discussing among yourselves whether to respond or not, chase away or not."
Madjar cited the example of Poland, where Russian aircraft used in the war against Ukraine have repeatedly flown in. How else can Poland be convinced that it is no longer a coincidence, Madjar asked.
"If a thousand units fly toward them at once, their jaws will drop. Then they will not know what to do," said Madjar. "As Ukraine's experience shows, a thousand [Shahed-type drones] at once is no problem."
In the near future, launching a thousand Shahed-type drones at once will be no problem for the Russian Armed Forces, Madjar is convinced.
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