Digitalization: Posts and News from Apvienotais saraksts
Political posts and news in Digitalization from Apvienotais saraksts, from monitored Latvian public sources.
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Andris Kulbergs (@AndrisKulbergs)
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@ivchix@Apvienotais_ I understand, but the data has been stolen from practically all residents; compensating would mean paying for ourselves... there's no such mystical pocket to draw from without affecting ourselves.
@AndrisKulbergs@Apvienotais_ Both historical and current have been stolen. Through addresses you can also gather those in the same household, no need even to be a state official, which we now want to protect. So the question of compensation for ALL whose data has been stolen, not just car collectors, is legitimate.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@ivchix@Apvienotais_ Addresses have been stolen, which are declared; for many they are not the same ones where they live. Addresses cannot be changed, compensated... that is not possible. Car numbers are the fastest and easiest solution to come to each victim. The situation is terrible, no easy solutions.
@AndrisKulbergs@Apvienotais_ Why the focus only on this? “For example, the possibility should be provided to change car numbers for free for those who wish. Initially, several hundred new numbers could be created, then handing in the old ones and gradually making the replacement.” Addresses were stolen for everyone, including those who have rights but no car.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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Day No. 63 in the prime minister's seat (Friday) — from the first speech in the Saeima, airBaltic to South Korean investments
Friday started early — with an interview on LTV's Morning Panorama. 📺☕️
Questions, of course, about the most current topics — CSDD and airBaltic.
35th anniversary of the restoration of Latvia's real independence — celebrations in the Saeima with my first speech to the Saeima parliament and an award at the Presidential Palace to the outstanding Māra Zālīte - I recommend listening to her speech delivered in verse, it was something special.
🚗 CSDD
In my opinion, CSDD now needs to come up with concrete solutions to reduce potential risks to citizens after the data leak.
➖️ For example, it should provide the option to change car license plates for free for those who wish. Initially, a few hundred new plates could be created, with old ones handed in and gradually replaced. That's just one possible solution.
➖️ I also believe that every affected person should individually receive an apology letter from CSDD, clearly stating what exactly their data was stolen, what the potential risks are, and where to seek help.
✈️ airBaltic
I tried to very clearly explain one thing to TV viewers — it is NOT true that the government will now automatically give airBaltic 30 million euros again.
The Saeima has given the government the opportunity to decide whether to lend money to the company together with private investors or not.
If the state participates as a lender, then we can continue to sit at the same table where decisions about the company's future are made. No longer as owners or shareholders, but as lenders or bondholders.
Because it is no secret — currently the state, as an airBaltic shareholder, has practically no real influence, and the value of our shares has effectively been lost. That's why it's important to at least retain the possibility to be at the table and know what will happen with the company next.
🇰🇷 Later in the day, I met with the Vice-Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Park Duk-hyum.
The conversation was very practical — not diplomacy for its own sake, but about concrete business, investments, and cooperation.
➖️ We discussed the MiCA regulation and Latvia's potential to become an even more significant financial and crypto-asset hub in Europe. Latvia already has its success stories here.
➖️ We agreed to develop the idea of Ādaži cooperation with a partner city in South Korea. 🇱🇻🤝🇰🇷
➖️ I told about the advantages and uniqueness of the Sēlija military training ground, as well as Latvia's defense industry opportunities.
➖️ We also talked about Ķekava and specific cooperation opportunities.
💊 I see very good opportunities for Latvia's chemistry and pharmaceutical industry to cooperate with Korean companies in the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients and components.
⚡️ Particularly interesting — a South Korean company plans investments in a methane production plant and SMR (small modular reactor) technology. Latvia should be active here from the very beginning.
And at the end of the conversation, I said a very simple thing:
We, politicians, are paid also to bring together entrepreneurs, investors, and opportunities. Not only to talk about the economy, but to help create real deals.
And it seems we are getting better and better at it. 💪
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@B03091315B@CSDD_LV@AndrejsDeeCee And how exactly do you imagine physically implementing that? What would be the technical solution?
You want to know, CSDD clearly provides such an option.
@CSDD_LV@AndrejsDeeCee Why do I have to go to e-csdd to see what those idiots have recorded for the hacker? CSDD has an OBLIGATION to inform EACH person individually whose data was leaked!! Andris Kulbergs understands that, right?
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@artis_dobrajs@agris_krusts@AlbertsZiemelis Exactly why I am asking that every CSDD cyberattack victim receive information about the offense.. there may be differences, because hackers leaked information in small portions
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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Day No. 60 (TUESDAY) — cybersecurity, border, and order in state administration
Tuesday started immediately with serious questions:
🛡️ Extraordinary meeting on cybersecurity
➖️ CSDD data security incident. I have already published a separate video about this, so I won't repeat it all.
🔗Links: [https://t.co/AXkr1kIlhC]
🏛️ Cabinet of Ministers meeting
➖️ VILKATIS — data on pushed-back border crossers shows that the operation is working. A migrant transporter was also detained at the time of committing the crime.
➖️ The second tunnel has been discovered on the border. For comparison — in Lithuania, a total of 7 tunnels have been discovered. This again shows with what methods they are trying to test and circumvent our border security.
➖️ We also advanced a draft law on the use of land for national defense needs, so that in acute and nationally important moments we could act quickly rather than get stuck in procedures.
👥 Prime Minister's office meeting and work planning
➖️ NGO Memorandum Council — the State Chancellery has prepared changes to the procedure. Payment for Council members for participation in meetings at the ministerial table will be abolished. I believe that participation in dialogue with the government cannot in itself become a paid position.
➖️ In the re-announced competition for the Director of the State Chancellery, where requirements were normalized and made more reasonable, 18 applications have already been received. In the previous competition there were only 6.
That is already a good signal. I hope that among the candidates there will be capable people with the ambition not just to administer the system, but to help change it. 💪🇱🇻
I congratulate my office colleague and advisor @Bolevics on obtaining the honorary family status of 3 children – the birth of a daughter!!! We in Latvia need large, strong families. Health to the mother and children.
🚨 CSDD CYBERATTACK — NEGLIGENCE WITH REAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE SECURITY — Today about the @CSDD_LV cyberattack, its consequences, and what must be done now. The CSDD board and council have been dismissed. Temporary management will be appointed instead, while competitions for the permanent board and council are started immediately. 🔴 WHAT HAPPENED? ➖️ On August 8 at about 3:00 AM, from Friday to Saturday, an attacker broke into the CSDD system. ➖️ The breach occurred through the CSDD MEDICAL platform, which about 200 doctors use to enter medical certificates for vehicle drivers. ➖️ The attacker operated undisturbed through the system on Saturday and Sunday. ➖️ On Sunday evening, a large-scale data download occurred. ➖️ CSDD only learned of the suspicious activity on Monday. ➖️ On Wednesday, it was established that data theft had occurred. ➖️ The Prime Minister was only informed on Wednesday at 5:00 PM. ❗ HOW WAS THIS POSSIBLE AT ALL? CSDD should have had secure multi-factor authentication. But CSDD MEDICAL access was possible only with a regular username and password. CSDD had every opportunity to implement top-level cybersecurity: 💶 there were financial resources; 💻 there was IT capacity; 🧠 there were knowledge and specialists. Yet self-assurance, negligence, and arrogance toward cybersecurity risks have led to one of the most serious data leaks in state possession. It threatens not only people's privacy but also the security of citizens, businesses, and the state. 📂 WHAT DATA HAS LEAKED? A very large volume of data is concerned: ➖️ data of approximately 1.3 million private individuals; ➖️ data of approximately 200,000 companies; ➖️ payment information for the period from 2008 to 2026; ➖️ first name, surname, or company name; ➖️ personal code or company registration number; ➖️ declared address; ➖️ vehicle state registration number. I do not understand why CSDD needed to store payment data since 2008 on its servers at all, if the regulatory acts do not require such storage. 🛡️ WARNINGS WERE THERE. THEY WERE NOT USED. CSDD had a contract with TET for server and connection cybersecurity, but not for the protection of CSDD's own application and software. Moreover. https://t.co/Y2dCsXsES5 had already offered from January to April 2026 to install its sensors that automatically identify suspicious anomalies in the network. The CERT measure is free. CSDD refused it. ⚖️ A submission has been filed with the prosecutor's office for possible negligence or wrongdoing. Law enforcement authorities must now establish the responsibility of each official. ✅ WHAT DO WE DO NEXT? I have issued a Prime Minister's resolution with 12 specific tasks for ministries and state institutions. Key ones: ➖️ CSDD must inform every affected person and company, indicating what specific data has leaked. ➖️ https://t.co/Y2dCsXsES5 sensors must be mandatorily installed in all critically important state systems so that anomalies are identified in a timely manner, not several days after the breach. ➖️ All critical infrastructure and sensitive data institutions must carry out full-scale intrusion simulations, i.e., penetration tests, to really test system resilience and find weaknesses before an attacker does. ➖️ Instructed to assess the possibility of restricting the freely accessible e-CSDD vehicle number plate check tool. ➖️ Instructed to assess how quickly state systems can abandon the use of the personal code as a username, moving to a more secure identification solution. ➖️ https://t.co/Y2dCsXsES5 has submitted a list of other state institutions that similarly refused the proposed cybersecurity measures. Next week we will go through this list. And the questions will be unpleasant. ⚠️ A MUCH GREATER STATE SECURITY RISK — declarations of officials. Individually, this data is already sensitive. But in combination with other publicly available state databases, it becomes a very effective profiling tool. The declaration information of officials in the VID system is currently freely viewable without user identification. In the era of artificial intelligence, the collection, structuring, and linking of huge amounts of data takes not months, but minutes. This means that such data can be systematically collected and regularly updated also by the services of Russia, Belarus, North Korea, or other countries. By combining CSDD's stolen data with publicly available declarations and other databases, it is possible to profile: 👮 police officers; 🪖 soldiers; 🛂 border guards; 🕵️ security service employees; 🏛️ officials and their families. This is already a national security issue. Declarations must remain accessible to the public, but I see no justification for them being mass-copied anonymously. The solution can be very simple — the information remains public, but access is after authentication, for example, with one's profile at https://t.co/2abj1S4l9U. 🌲 AND I HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THE @valstsmezi CYBERATTACK. From the Minister of Agriculture @ArmandsKrauze I expect a concrete answer: who in Latvian State Forests was responsible for the systematic failure to update server software, which allowed the attacker to exploit vulnerabilities? Next week I want on the table: ➖️ the name and surname of the responsible official; ➖️ an explanation of how this was allowed; ➖️ information on what consequences and responsibility will follow. 🇱🇻 WE DO NOT LIVE IN A PEACETIME DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT. Latvia lives under constant hybrid threat conditions. Next to us are aggressor states that use all possible methods against our country. At the same time, artificial intelligence has made the preparation, automation, and data processing of cyberattacks much easier. Therefore, the attitude — “surely nothing will happen to us” — is no longer acceptable in public administration. Cybersecurity is not a technical matter for the IT department. It is state security. ❓ AND I ALSO HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NCC NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTRE. I am interested in how it can be that the National Cybersecurity Centre, which had about 20 million euros in 2025 and about 28 million euros in 2026, has not been able to achieve significantly higher resilience of state systems against such attacks? That is very serious funding. About half of the public television and radio media budget. With such funding, there must also be a measurable result: ✅ how many institutions have actually been tested; ✅ how many vulnerabilities have been eliminated; ✅ in how many systems multi-factor authentication has been introduced; ✅ in how many institutions have https://t.co/Y2dCsXsES5 sensors been installed; ✅ how many real cyberattack simulation tests have been conducted; ✅ and who is responsible if known risks remain unaddressed for years. I have questions. And I expect very concrete answers. Cybersecurity cannot be fixed with presentations, strategies, and reports.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Politiķis un žurnālists
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The communication crisis after the storm would be a very good reason to review the government's plans regarding the planned deal in the telecommunications sector. Paying half a billion for something that only lasts two hours without electricity would be unwise.
This storm was a painful dress rehearsal for Latvia's and every person's readiness to overcome crisis situations. Thank you to firefighters, medics, police officers, electricity network crews, municipal workers, volunteers and everyone who is still working to help people and restore critical services. The storm showed an unpleasant truth: if electricity disappears over a wide area, many other critical everyday services also start to stop. Many of us were affected not only by the lack of electricity. Mobile communications and internet were disrupted, fuel stations, shops, ATMs, payment terminals and traffic lights did not work. Traffic and train movement were disrupted. In places, water supply and sewerage operations were endangered. Even operational services in some places had difficulty refueling their vehicles. The storm also revealed a problem with cash circulation. Without electricity and internet, card payments may not be possible, and ATMs do not work. Under these circumstances, cash becomes a critically important reserve means of payment. There must be a clear action plan by the state, banks and merchants on how to ensure the availability and circulation of cash during a crisis. People reported that in some shops, bread and drinking water ran out within three to four hours. We need to assess whether shops and logistics networks are ready for a rapid increase in demand and can ensure the supply of essential goods also when electricity, communications and electronic payments do not work. Equally important is the operation of pharmacies and the availability of medicines. What happens if a pharmacy has no electricity, internet or access to e-prescriptions? Where can a person get life-saving medicines? How is the public informed about working pharmacies? There must also be a clear crisis algorithm here, not improvisation after the event. Unfortunately, today I did not find a unified, comprehensible and regularly updated overview of the situation. People had to search for information themselves on the websites and social media accounts of various institutions, companies and municipalities. But during a crisis, a person must be able to get answers to very specific questions in one place: ❓ Where is there no electricity? ❓ Where are mobile communications and internet not working? ❓ Which roads are closed and where is public transport disrupted? ❓ Where is water supply and sewerage endangered? ❓ Which shops, fuel stations and pharmacies are operating? ❓ What exactly is being done? ❓ In what order are damages expected to be repaired and services restored? Such information must be unified, verified and regularly updated. At the same time, there should be a backup information solution for situations when people have no electricity, internet or mobile communications. Once the acute crisis phase has been overcome, I expect a comprehensive assessment from the Crisis Management Center on how the state overcame this crisis, what worked, what did not and what urgently needs to be improved. The assessment must conclude with a concrete action plan, specifying those responsible, deadlines and necessary investments. But responsibility is not only on the state. Also every Latvian household must critically assess whether we seriously took the previously distributed warnings and whether we can cope for at least 72 hours without electricity, internet, shop, ATM and immediate operational services help. Do we have drinking water, food, necessary medicines, a flashlight, batteries, a charged external battery, a radio and cash at home? Does the family have a comprehensible action plan? Do we know how we will help children, seniors, neighbours and people with special needs? This time it was a storm about which we received advance warnings. The next crisis may start without such warning. I am currently in Ukraine, where they have to deal with an identical situation every day. Yesterday I saw with my own eyes how crisis coordination systems are integrated into a military command center, where you can see every service online - VUGD, police, medicine, gas, municipal services, rescuers... all. I will bring this system to Latvia.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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This storm was a painful dress rehearsal for Latvia's and every person's readiness to overcome crisis situations. Thank you to firefighters, medics, police officers, electricity network crews, municipal workers, volunteers and everyone who is still working to help people and restore critical services. The storm showed an unpleasant truth: if electricity disappears over a wide area, many other critical everyday services also start to stop. Many of us were affected not only by the lack of electricity. Mobile communications and internet were disrupted, fuel stations, shops, ATMs, payment terminals and traffic lights did not work. Traffic and train movement were disrupted. In places, water supply and sewerage operations were endangered. Even operational services in some places had difficulty refueling their vehicles. The storm also revealed a problem with cash circulation. Without electricity and internet, card payments may not be possible, and ATMs do not work. Under these circumstances, cash becomes a critically important reserve means of payment. There must be a clear action plan by the state, banks and merchants on how to ensure the availability and circulation of cash during a crisis. People reported that in some shops, bread and drinking water ran out within three to four hours. We need to assess whether shops and logistics networks are ready for a rapid increase in demand and can ensure the supply of essential goods also when electricity, communications and electronic payments do not work. Equally important is the operation of pharmacies and the availability of medicines. What happens if a pharmacy has no electricity, internet or access to e-prescriptions? Where can a person get life-saving medicines? How is the public informed about working pharmacies? There must also be a clear crisis algorithm here, not improvisation after the event. Unfortunately, today I did not find a unified, comprehensible and regularly updated overview of the situation. People had to search for information themselves on the websites and social media accounts of various institutions, companies and municipalities. But during a crisis, a person must be able to get answers to very specific questions in one place: ❓ Where is there no electricity? ❓ Where are mobile communications and internet not working? ❓ Which roads are closed and where is public transport disrupted? ❓ Where is water supply and sewerage endangered? ❓ Which shops, fuel stations and pharmacies are operating? ❓ What exactly is being done? ❓ In what order are damages expected to be repaired and services restored? Such information must be unified, verified and regularly updated. At the same time, there should be a backup information solution for situations when people have no electricity, internet or mobile communications. Once the acute crisis phase has been overcome, I expect a comprehensive assessment from the Crisis Management Center on how the state overcame this crisis, what worked, what did not and what urgently needs to be improved. The assessment must conclude with a concrete action plan, specifying those responsible, deadlines and necessary investments. But responsibility is not only on the state. Also every Latvian household must critically assess whether we seriously took the previously distributed warnings and whether we can cope for at least 72 hours without electricity, internet, shop, ATM and immediate operational services help. Do we have drinking water, food, necessary medicines, a flashlight, batteries, a charged external battery, a radio and cash at home? Does the family have a comprehensible action plan? Do we know how we will help children, seniors, neighbours and people with special needs? This time it was a storm about which we received advance warnings. The next crisis may start without such warning. I am currently in Ukraine, where they have to deal with an identical situation every day. Yesterday I saw with my own eyes how crisis coordination systems are integrated into a military command center, where you can see every service online - VUGD, police, medicine, gas, municipal services, rescuers... all. I will bring this system to Latvia.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@SkaidriteIesal7@edgarsrinkevics Why is someone always misleading - nobody said to deny access - simply put a connection filter via e-signature or SmartID, so that bots, AI scrapers, and anonymous agents couldn't easily get through.
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@JurgisLiepnieks@AndrejsUrbans You're not clueless... you understand very well what I'm saying. Access through identification and everything is ok. No anonymity and risk of AI tool scrapers and mass data pumping. An individual can be identified and mass anomalies prevented.
@AndrisKulbergs@AndrejsUrbans Yes? What is that then? You yourself explained that North Koreans need to be restricted, otherwise they will unrestrictedly study Latvian officials' declarations.
@guntarsv@AndrisKulbergs Listen for a few minutes to the accountant's speech about absurdities in legislation - that is exactly why we have few small entrepreneurs. https://t.co/pnF2PmOFxm
@JurgisLiepnieks It suddenly became a national security issue after 35 years, maybe because from the declaration you can see that Rinkēvičs has bonds worth 300k? And Russia already has an example of how to hide everything, why not copy it?
This logic is devastating: By combining CSDD's stolen data with publicly available declarations and other databases, it is possible to profile: 👮 police officers; 🪖 soldiers; 🛂 border guards; 🕵️ security service employees; 🏛️ officials and their families. Of course, all of this is possible! And it has ALL ALREADY BEEN DONE! What does restricting access have to do with it?? Then suddenly 99% of all officials will change and everything will be discreet again??
@AndrisKulbergs@CSDD_LV@Apvienotais_ Speaking of IT solutions, CSDD had nothing to offer or sell... There was always this TET and Kindril monopoly... that's why there are no new and modern IT security systems...
APVIENOTAIS SARAKSTS - Latvijas Zaļā partija, Latvijas Reģionu Apvienība, Liepājas partija · Ministru prezidents
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@AndrejsDeeCee@CSDD_LV@Apvienotais_ There is a very interesting story, there will be separate info about TET, but everything points to very interesting oddities on the CSDD side, where TET is not involved... there will be info when there is confirming data.
@AndrisKulbergs@CSDD_LV@Apvienotais_ 'CSDD had a contract with TET for server and connection cybersecurity' then TET SHOULD have detected data leakage or suspicious network activity. Of course, the question is which products and solutions are connected, but network flow monitoring should have reported suspicious data volume.