Madjar's message to the Baltic states: clear the border with Russia and create a death zone
August 13, 2026
Source: https://t.co/DoTlanYlJy
Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces commander, Major Robert Brovdi, also known as "Madjar", recommends that the Baltic states prepare much more seriously for a possible Russian attack.
* Recommendation: create a three to five kilometer wide clean zone on the border so there is nowhere for a drone to hide.
* Underground fiber-optic cable infrastructure must be created to fully monitor the entire border with drones.
* Madjar: all this can be done quickly, even this year, if only the Baltic states have the will.
Estonia and the other Baltic states still misassess Russia's military threats and are not preparing adequately, Ukrainian drone forces commander Major Robert Brovdi (50) said in an interview with Postimees.
Madjar offered Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania his action plan for quickly building strong defenses against a possible Russian attack using drones. His recommendations are based on creating a "death zone" on the Russian border with drones so that, figuratively speaking, even a mouse could not slip through unnoticed.
"Guys, don't hesitate. Here are the first five steps you need to complete in 2026," Brovdi, better known by his call sign Madjar, said in an interview with Postimees in early August. "These are not complicated things. You just need to make a decision and carry it out."
Madjar's five-step recommendation for Baltic defense, presented to Postimees, was not made up on the spot. Already when agreeing to the interview, I was clearly made to understand that Madjar very much wanted to talk about Baltic defense. During the interview it was clear that Madjar had carefully thought about what the Baltic states' capability and readiness should be in the event of a possible Russian attack or military provocation.
According to Madjar, the plan he recommends for the Baltic states is based on the goal of not letting the enemy into their territory at all. "If you already know in advance that an attack is being planned against you, you can immediately strike back and not let the enemy into your territory," he emphasized.
Five proposals
Proposal 1 – create a conditional "death zone" along the border with Russia (in Lithuania's case, on the border with Belarus). It is a zone where drones can fly and attack without obstacles. The wider, the better. Given the small territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this "death zone" should be at least two to five kilometers wide.
"Cut down absolutely everything there," said Madjar. "It must be completely open terrain where drones must destroy absolutely everything that moves. So you can't hide behind trees or buildings. Everything must be clearly visible. That's your so-called buffer zone."
Proposal 2 – for the "death zone" to work, special infrastructure must be created for the use of modern technologies. All these technologies require communications. As Madjar points out, Ukraine's war experience shows that the most reliable communications are via fiber optic cable.
"Not over the air, but it must be laid in the ground. 30-50 centimeters underground," said Madjar. "And these communications must be ensured along the entire length of your border, forming a unified network."
The fiber optic network deployed along the entire border must be interconnected so that various sensors and cameras, drone positions, communication points, and so on can be connected at different points. All this underground fiber optic network must be connected between all the Baltic states.
"This infrastructure built with fiber optic cables will allow the construction of the necessary number of drone launch sites in the future, from which drones can take off, while pilots will control them remotely," said Madjar. "For pilots to be safe, they need to work from Riga, Vilnius, London, or anywhere else. The important thing is that it happens remotely."
Proposal 3 – effective tactical or short-range air defense must be created that can see 15-30 kilometers away. Such air defense must be densely deployed along the created "death zone".
The purpose of such air defense is to detect all enemy reconnaissance and strike drones flying in the air. Detect them at any altitude and then destroy them either with interceptor drones, electronic warfare (EW) means, or other methods.
"If the enemy wants to invade you, they won't come with tanks. They won't start with artillery shelling," said Madjar. "Initially they will come with reconnaissance drones. They will look everything over, and then strike drones and missiles will fly in. You need to know this and be ready."
Expensive radars and expensive air defense systems should be left deeper in the rear to monitor the global situation. If expensive radar systems appear near the front, the enemy will destroy them first. "Destroying these systems will make you blind, deaf, and helpless," Madjar emphasized.
Proposal 4 – at least one specialized drone brigade must be established in each Baltic state. In Ukraine, one drone brigade means 300 drone crews. "They are all drone crews with different purposes," said Madjar.
To describe why exactly complex drone use with different purposes and against different targets helps effectively fight Russian forces, Madjar uses the concept of a "borscht recipe".
"This 'borscht recipe' includes a list of various types of crews that operate at different depths, work with different means, and are located at different distances from each other," Madjar explained.
Borscht, the most famous Ukrainian dish, will not be perfect if any of the necessary ingredients are missing. According to Madjar, the same applies to drone forces – the thing doesn't work if a component is missing.
In war conditions, a brigade with 300 crews built on the "borscht recipe" principle can cover a hundred-kilometer stretch, Madjar believes. In peacetime, when this brigade mainly needs to observe the enemy and be on standby, it can also cover 500-600 kilometers, Madjar noted.
However, it would be best if Estonia's, Latvia's, and Lithuania's armed forces created separate drone forces, as has long been the case in Ukraine and now also in Russia.
"What more experience do you need if we constantly prove that it works?" Madjar asked. "Currently, we hit 80 percent of all targets with drones."
"Should I come and dance a national dance for you on this topic so you understand? That's experience," added Madjar, known for his expressive language.
Proposal 5 – the ability to strike the attacking enemy's logistics and military facilities. This requires medium- and long-range drones, as well as their crews.
According to Madjar, the drone brigade should prepare 30-50 crews for medium- and long-range drones capable of striking the enemy at operational and strategic depth.
"To change the opponent's plans, to deliver strikes that force them to change their plans and timelines," said Madjar.
Training of medium- and long-range drone pilots for Estonia's, Latvia's, and Lithuania's armed forces must begin immediately, Madjar believes. He noted that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will gladly help with this matter.
Achievable this year
Creating a "death zone" on the border with Russia and deploying a fiber optic network are things that can be done quickly, still within this year, Madjar notes. If there is the will, the Ukrainian drone forces commander emphasized. He claimed that none of these measures requires budgets in the billions.
"It costs a few million, but you can do it yourselves, and it can be done quickly," said Madjar. "Provided that the state itself doesn't work against it and there are no problems with private lands – about who allows something to be done and who doesn't."
"Here you have to choose: either you start bargaining with your entrepreneurs, or you take a national position that all this must be done," Madjar continued. "Just do it. Give them something else in return so they don't hold on to this land so much. Because they will be the first to suffer when the Muscovites invade you."
In 2024, the three Baltic states signed an agreement to establish the Baltic Defense Line on the border with Russia and Belarus. However, it will be completely different from the defense line the Ukrainian drone forces commander recommends building.
The already-started Baltic Defense Line is a system of defensive structures and obstacles consisting of fortified strongpoints, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles, minefields, and the like. Its construction uses natural obstacles: forests, swamps, rivers, etc. Estonia plans to build up to 600 company-level bunkers.
Construction of anti-tank ditches for the Baltic Defense Line in the Meremäe area, Setomaa parish, this spring. Photo: Margus Ansu
If Russia attacked, this defense line, according to the vision of the Estonian Ministry of Defense, should slow down and redirect the movement of Russian units and force them to move to places where they are easier to destroy with fire. According to the creators of the defense line, this would give Estonia's, Latvia's, and Lithuania's forces, as well as NATO allies, time and more favorable conditions to destroy the enemy. Strategically, the goal is deterrence – to show that a quick breakthrough in the Baltic states will not succeed and that the territory will be defended from the very first meter.
According to Madjar, building such a defense line is based on the experience of the previous war. "This is not promising," he said. "You cannot stop an enemy attack with kinetics." By "kinetics" Madjar means fortifications and the firepower of traditional weapons.
"If today the dominant tool is the drone, then infrastructure and the necessary conditions must be created specifically for drone use," he added.
Currently there is not even a one percent probability that Russia would organize an attack on the Baltic states with tanks and mechanized columns, Madjar is convinced.
Madjar emphasized that the Baltic states must create what is currently relevant and effective in Ukraine and gain experience in using it. This also includes organizing logistics with aerial and ground drones.
"You need to train evacuation of the wounded with robots, not people," said Madjar. "Train all electronic warfare (EW) skills. And what is needed for that again? Build fiber optic infrastructure."
Criticism of NATO
According to Madjar's assessment, the probability of a Russian attack is increased by the fact that NATO has so far not demonstrated unity and adequate action in the face of the Kremlin's provocations.
"A Russian drone flies into your airspace, then a missile, then an aircraft flies over, conducts reconnaissance, then a warship approaches and also conducts reconnaissance, but you only express concern that you don't like it," said Madjar.
"Shoot it down when it approaches! Take the shot so it sinks, it won't come back," Madjar advised. "But you don't do that. I'm talking about NATO countries. You only start discussing among yourselves whether to respond or not, to drive away or not."
Madjar cited the example of Poland, where Russian aircraft used in the war against Ukraine have repeatedly flown in. How else can Poland be convinced that it is no longer an accident, Madjar asked.
"If a thousand units fly toward them at once, their jaws will drop. Then they won't know what to do," said Madjar. "As Ukraine's experience shows, a thousand [Shahed-type drones] at once is no problem."
In the near future, launching a thousand Shahed-type drones at once will be no problem for the Russian armed forces, Madjar is convinced.
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